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LETTERS OF INDEMNITY ^ DELIVERYOF GOODS WITHOUT BILLS OF LADING
Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas
[2004] HCA 35; High Court of Australia (5 August 2004)
Facts
This appeal to the High Court from the Supreme Court of New SouthWales centres on two legal
issues:
^ the construction of certain letters of indemnity given in favour of carrier in relation to the
discharge of cargowithout bills of lading, and
^ whether the letters of indemnity, signed by an unauthorized officer of the bank, were binding on
the bank.
A contract of sale of a cargo of legumes wasmade betweenNEAT, an Australian grain exporter, and
Royal, an Indian grain importer. NEAT's bank, BNP Paribas in Sydney, was financing the export
transaction.The cargo was to be carried on the MV Nelson, a ship hired under a time charter by a
company called Pacific.
The initialbills of ladingwere switched and split.Therewere also serious delays in the discharge of the
goods.NEAT then sought to speedup theprocessby askingRoyal to obtain a letter of indemnity from
the latter's bank to persuade the carrier to deliver up the goods without production of the bills of
lading.Royal drafted a form of words and approached its bank.However, the bank declined to act as
indemnifier. NEAT then approached its own bank, BNP Paribas, with a view of obtaining a letter of
indemnity for the samepurpose.The letters of indemnity issuedby thebank's officer in Sydney was in
fact in the form drafted by Royal and contained an English law clause.The letters of indemnity were
signed first by the director of NEATand then immediately belowNEAT's director's signaturewas the
BNP officer's signature.
The cargowas subsequently deliveredwithoutproduction of thebills of lading in Calcutta.Thevessel
was subsequently arrested.NEAT became insolvent. Pacific had delivered the goodswithout seeking
production of the bills of lading because of two letters of indemnity issued to their favour by BNP
Paribas.They claimed to be indemnified by the bank.BNP's defencewas that, on a true construction
of the letters of indemnity, only NEATwas bound to indemnify Pacific, and BNP's rolewasmerely to
authenticate or verify NEAT's execution of the documents. Additionally, BNP argued that as the
officer who signed the letters of indemnity had no authority to issue them, the bank was thus not
bound.
The Court of Appeal held against Pacific, ruling that although the letters of indemnity did purport to
indemnify the carrier for delivering up goods without seeking production of the bills of lading, the
bank was not bound by the unauthorized acts of its officer.
Decision
The High Court allowed the appeal. It upheld the Court of Appeal's construction of the letters of
indemnity but disagreed with the Court of Appeal's position on the lack of authority issue. The
Court of Appeal had thought it material that the requisite representation of authority by the bank
was absent. It was persuaded by the argument that the necessary representation of authority must
have been made to Pacific by BNP about the officer's authority, not one made by the officer about
herself. Although the High Court agreed that this was a correct statement of law, the way it was
applied was an over-simplification. The High Court considered that on an assessment of case law,
what was material was whether the respondent had been persuaded to believe that the bank had
indeedmade the representation.The bank officer in the case had signed and stamped the letters of
indemnity.The presence of the stamp was, as far as the High Court was concerned, pivotal. Pacific
was clearlypersuadedby the signature andby thebank's official stamp that the officer in questionhad
indeed the authority to bind the bank.
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Comment
This case raises an importantpracticalmatter: the form of words used in a letter of indemnity issued
in support of delivery of goods withoutproduction of the bills of lading. It is trite law that the carrier
would be liable for conversion if he delivers goods carried on his vessel to a person without the
relevant bill of lading. However, the common law recognizes that it should not be illegal for a third
party (such as a bank) to issue a letter of indemnity promising to indemnify the carrier for any
probable or eventual liability for delivering up goods without production of the bill of lading (Sze Hai
Tong Bank v Rambler Cycle Co Ltd [1959] AC 576) given the commercial exigencies at port when
turnaround time for the ship might be short.The difficulty in the case, however, was how the letter
of indemnity should be construed.The bank's position was that when the letters of indemnity were
issued, it was for a b`ack-to-back'purpose, as Royal's ownbankwas unprepared to act as indemnifier.
Moreover, the bank officer who signed and issued them gave evidence that she had mentioned to
NEAT that the letters were only for verification of the signatures.
It is immediately obvious that the communications between the bank's officer and NEATwere
irrelevant to the construction of the letters of indemnity. Indeed, they would also be irrelevant to
the want of authority issue. The person who mattered was Pacific; the question was, on a proper
construction of the letters of indemnity, whether Pacific was entitled to treat not only NEAT but
also BNP as the indemnifiers.The High Court re-stated the general rule of construction in common
law that the construction of the letters of indemnity was tobe determinedby what a reasonableperson
in Pacific's position would have understood them to mean.That clearly required consideration, not
only of the text of the documents but also the surrounding circumstances known to Pacific and BNP,
and the purpose and object of the transaction (Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1WLR
989, per Lord Wilberforce at 995 to 996, whose dictum was accepted by the Australian court in
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New SouthWales (1982) 149 CLR 337).
What was troublesome in this case was the fact that the bank officer's signature came immediately
below that of NEAT's director, leading to the argument that the bank was doing no more than to
verify the director's signatures in both letters of indemnity.That led to the court of first instance to
conclude (and in so doing rejected both constructions offered by BNP and Pacific) that when BNP
signed the indemnity itwas representing to Pacific thatNEAT had the financial capacity to honour its
obligations under the letters of indemnity.On that basis, it was thus open to Pacific to succeed in a
claim in negligence (negligent misstatement about NEAT's financial standing) against BNP. That
constructionwas rejected both by the Court of Appeal and the High Court on the grounds that the
commercial purpose of the indemnity was plainly that NEATwas to secure the backing of another
person to underwrite the indemnity. The communications between NEATand Pacific showed that
Pacific would not be prepared to deliver the goods without presentment of the bills of lading
without an indemnity issued by a bank.What is of some practical importance here is that the court
appeared to accept the assumption that, unless made expressly clear, a carrier would expect a bank
to act as indemnifier.The commercial nature of such an indemnity is to provide an elementof security
to the carrier: it would be commercially odd for a carrier to rely on the warranty offered by the
consignor whose financial capacity was unknown to him.
There was a subsidiary issue at first instance whichwas not dealt with by the Court of Appeal. BNP
had argued that, by the time the letters of indemnity were invoked, the originalbills of ladingreferred
to had been cancelled as a result of switching and splitting, so the letters of indemnity were spent or
incapable of having further effect.Clause 4 of the letters of indemnity provided that:
As soon as all original bills of lading for the above goods shall have come into our possession, to produce
and deliver the same to youwhereupon our liability hereunder shall cease.
The High Court observed that BNP was aware that the bills of lading were to be switched and split.
The court reasoned that the letters of indemnity must have been issued for the very purpose of
dealing with a situation where no bills of lading were produced by the person or persons seeking
delivery of the goods.Given the knowledge of Pacific and NEAT that the initial bills of lading would
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be cancelled and switchedbills issued, itwouldbe absurd to construe the document as producing the
consequence that upon the cancellation of the original bills the obligation to indemnify would cease.
This was clearly a case of a contractual clause being construed in a commercially unsound manner.
The court thus rejected BNP's argument.What is especially interesting here is the use of a s`tandard'
indemnity in unusual circumstances (at least from a textbook perspective given the fact that switch
bills were used). The lesson is thus that an indemnity should really be drafted with the specific
circumstances of the case in mind; practitioners should be careful not to assume that standard
precedents will work in all cases.
On the authority issue, theHighCourt acknowledged that thebankofficer hadno actual authority to
sign and issue the letters of indemnity: she andherdepartmentwerenot so authorized.However, the
law is clear that internal limits of authority cannot allow a contracting party to resile from its
obligations on the basis of want of authority of the agent provided there is ostensible authority.The
Court of Appeal was persuaded by the contention that ostensible authority depended on a
representation of authority by the bank, not by the officer herself. The High Court, however, was
right to find that although that was a correct statement of the law, the representation of authority
need not be confined to an explicit or express representation.Representations of authority could be
derived from the company's conduct and that conduct included the company's organizational
structure which is apparent to the external person. In the present case, the court found that the
bank's organizational structure in Sydney at that time was such that the officer in question was
Pacific's contact person. The court was also persuaded by the fact that the stamp used clearly
suggested an imprimatur that Pacific was entitled to rely on.The law, as reasserted by the court,
was that corporate conduct as a whole must be assessed when deciding whether a representation
of authority had beenmade.
Another practical lessonmight be learnt.BNP in Sydney was a relatively small set-up.Therewere no
procedures for the officer to seek legal advice about themanner and form of BNP's signature, or to
take other steps to see that itwas communicated to Pacific that thebankwas onlyprepared toverify
and authenticate the signatures. It is notunusual formerchantbanks to have large offices outside their
main countries of operationbut they woulddowell to ensure that these smaller officeshave access to
appropriate legal guidance. JC
VOYAGE CHARTER ^ ASBATANKVOY FORM ^ DEMURRAGE ^ DELAY IN
DISCHARGING ^ SAFE BERTH AND SHIFTING CLAUSE ^ BREAKDOWN OF
EQUIPMENT ^ ADDITIONAL FEES AND EXPENSES ^ CONSTRUCTION
Portolana Compania Naviera Ltd v Vitol SA Inc and Another (The Afrapearl)
[2004] EWCA 864; [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep 305
Facts
The Afrapearl, a tanker of 86,417 tonnes deadweight, was chartered for a ladenvoyage of fuel oil from
two loading ports in the USGulf to Dakar, Senegal and Gibraltar.Dakar was subsequently added to
the permissible discharge ports by an addendum.The charterparty was on an amended Asbatankoy
form and various addenda.The vessel was ordered to discharge at Dakar, where the discharge was
ordered to be in three parts:
(i) 20,000 tonnesmin/max at M'bao sealine
(ii) 10,000 tonnesmin/max at the SAR terminal for account of SAR and
(iii) 5,250 tonnesmin/max at the SAR terminal for account of Addax/Oryx Sengal.
SAR is the acronym of Socie¨te¨ Africaine de Raffinage, the owners and operators of the sealine and
terminal with a traditional discharging berthwithin the port of Dakar.
The charterparty contained clauses relating to notice of readiness, laytime, demurrage and shifting.
Thewording of two of these clauses came into issue and are of particular relevance:
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